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Abstract
We present a classification of quantum public-key encryption protocols. There
are six elements in quantum public-key encryption: plaintext, ciphertext,
public-key, private-key, encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm. Ac-
cording to the property of each element which is either quantum or classical,
the quantum public-key encryption protocols can be divided into 64 kinds.
Among 64 kinds of protocols, 8 kinds have already been constructed, 52 kinds
can be proved to be impossible to construct and the remaining 4 kinds have
not been presented effectively yet. This indicates that the research on quan-
tum public-key encryption protocol should be focus on the existed kinds and
the unproposed kinds.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Diffie and Hellman [1] lay the foundation of modern cryptography by
presenting the concept of public-key encryption. Contrary to symmetric-key
encryption which uses the same key to encrypt and to decrypt, public-key
encryption uses a pair of different keys, public-key and private-key, to encrypt
and to decrypt. Classical public-key encryption has been widely used in
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many fields. However, Shor’s algorithm [2] and Gover’s algorithm [3] can
attack the computational difficulty problems which are used as the premises
of constructing classical public-key encryption. The research on quantum
public-key encryption can pre-empt such potential threats.
Analogous to the analysis of quantum symmetric-encryption protocols[4],
a quantum public-key encryption consists of six elements: plaintext, cipher-
text, public-key, private-key, encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm.
If an encryption protocol involved quantum part, it can be taken as the
counterpart of classical public-key encryption. With the advent of quantum
key distribution protocol, BB84[5], quantum public-key encryption has at-
tained great development. Okamoto’s protocol[6] is considered as the first
public-key encryption protocol which is based on the Knapsack-set prob-
lem. Gottesman[7] firstly proposed ”quantum public key cryptography with
information-theoretic security”. Up to now, there are some quantum public-
key encryption protocols. For purpose of further analyzing the property of
quantum public-key encryption and constructing new protocols, we classify
the quantum public-key encryption protocols.
This paper is organised as follows: a brief classification of quantum public-
key encryption protocols is given in section 2; we classify these protocols into
3 types, each type is explained in section 3,4,5; in section 6, we discuss
some problems exist in quantum public-key encryption protocols; finally,
conclusions are drawn in section 7.
2. Classification of quantum public-key encryption protocols
A quantum public-key encryption protocol is a six-tuple (P,C, PK, SK, E ,
D): plaintext (P ), ciphertext (C), public-key (PK), private-key (SK), en-
cryption algorithm (E ) and decryption algorithm (D). Each element can
be either classical or quantum, so there are 64 kinds of quantum public-
key encryption protocols in total. Among them, 8 kinds have already been
constructed, 52 kinds can be proved to be impossible to construct and the
remaining 4 kinds have not been presented effectively yet. Thus, we can
classify them into three types. The detail classification is show in table 1.
In Table 1, C denotes the element belongs to classical space, Q denotes
the element belongs to quantum space, E means the protocol exists, N means
the protocol does not exist, O means whether this kind of protocol exists or
not is still an open problem.
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Table 1: 64 kinds of quantum public-key encryption protocols
Kind (P C PK SK E D) existence
1 C C C C C C E
2 C C C C C Q E
3 C C C C Q C O
4 C C C C Q Q O
5 C Q C C C C N
6 C Q C C C Q N
7 C Q C C Q C N
8 C Q C C Q Q E
9 C C Q C C C N
10 C C Q C C Q N
11 C C Q C Q C N
12 C C Q C Q Q N
13 C C C Q C C N
14 C C C Q C Q N
15 C C C Q Q C N
16 C C C Q Q Q N
17 C Q Q C C C N
18 C Q Q C C Q N
19 C Q Q C Q C N
20 C Q Q C Q Q E
21 C C Q Q C C N
22 C C Q Q C Q N
23 C C Q Q Q C N
24 C C Q Q Q Q N
25 C Q C Q C C N
26 C Q C Q C Q N
27 C Q C Q Q C N
28 C Q C Q Q Q O
29 C Q Q Q C C N
30 C Q Q Q C Q N
31 C Q Q Q Q C N
32 C Q Q Q Q Q E
Kind (P C PK SK E D) existence
33 Q C C C C C N
34 Q C C C C Q N
35 Q C C C Q C N
36 Q C C C Q Q N
37 Q Q C C C C N
38 Q Q C C C Q N
39 Q Q C C Q C N
40 Q Q C C Q Q E
41 Q C Q C C C N
42 Q C Q C C Q N
43 Q C Q C Q C N
44 Q C Q C Q Q N
45 Q C C Q C C N
46 Q C C Q C Q N
47 Q C C Q Q C N
48 Q C C Q Q Q N
49 Q Q Q C C C N
50 Q Q Q C C Q N
51 Q Q Q C Q C N
52 Q Q Q C Q Q E
53 Q C Q Q C C N
54 Q C Q Q C Q N
55 Q C Q Q Q C N
56 Q C Q Q Q Q N
57 Q Q C Q C C N
58 Q Q C Q C Q N
59 Q Q C Q Q C N
60 Q Q C Q Q Q O
61 Q Q Q Q C C N
62 Q Q Q Q C Q N
63 Q Q Q Q Q C N
64 Q Q Q Q Q Q E
3
3. Type E
In this section, we will give simple examples about the existing 8 kinds
of quantum public-key encryption protocol. The numbers of these protocols
are 1, 2, 8, 20, 32, 40, 52, 64.
3.1. Kind 1
Broadly speaking, the classical public-key encryption protocol is a special
case of quantum public-key encryption protocol. Each elements in Classical
public-key encryption protocol is belong to classical space. There is no doubt
that Kind 1 exists, such as RSA[8] , ECC cryptosystem [9] , Rabin cryptosys-
tem [10] and so on. Okamoto proposed a QPKE protocol [6] based on the
Knapsack-set problem. All the six elements of this protocol are classical, but
the participants are all quantum Turing machines.
3.2. Kind 2
This kind uses quantum computation to decrypt. Supposed that dur-
ing the decryption of ElGamal cryptosystem [11] , the participant can use
Shor’s algorithm to solve the discrete problem to get the transmitted mes-
sage. Quantum attack to the classical PKE protocol is also belong to this
kind.
3.3. Kind 8
P, PK, SK ∈ C and C, E ,D ∈ Q according to the kind 8. We can use
the QPKE[12] based on the McEliece cryptosystem [13] to transmit classical
message x.
Protocol 1 (P, PK, SK ∈ C;C, E ,D ∈ Q). Let Alice’s public-key be G′ ,
G
′
= SGP . S is an invertible matrix, P is a permutation matrix and G is a
generator matrix of a Goppa code. And let her private-key be (S,G, P ).
[Encryption] Bob uses Alice’s public-key G
′
to encrypt the classicla mes-
sage x as below:
1. he prepares a quantum sate |x〉 and does Hadamard transformation on
it:
|x〉 → 1√
2
∑
m
(−1)m·x|m〉
=
∑
m
αm|m〉 (1)
4
2. he does transformation on the quantum message with Alice’s public-
key:
UG′ (
∑
m
αm|m〉k|0〉n) =
∑
m
αm|m〉k|mG′〉n; (2)
3. he randomly chooses an error e to add into the state:
Ue(
∑
m
αm|mG′〉n) =
∑
m
αm|mG′ ⊕ e〉n, (3)
and then sends
∑
m
αm|mG′ ⊕ e〉n to Alice.
[Decryption] Alice uses her private-key (S,G, P ) to decrypt the receiving
ciphertext:
1. she uses P−1 to do computation:
UP−1(
∑
m
αm|m〉k|mG′ ⊕ e〉n) =
∑
m
αm|m〉k|mSG⊕ e〉n; (4)
2. she takes advantage of H to apply the operator UH :
UH(
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ e〉n|0〉n−k) =
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ e〉n|s〉n−k, (5)
and then measures the second register to get the syndrome to find the
error via the fast decoding algorithm of the Goppa code generated by
G;
3. she uses error vector e to do computation:
Ue(
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ e〉n) =
∑
m
αm|mSG〉n; (6)
and also uses the inver matrix of G to do transform:
UG−1(
∑
m
αm|mSG〉n|0〉k) =
∑
m
αm|mSG〉n|mSGG−1〉k; (7)
4. finally, she does computation according to S−1 to get the quantum
message:
US−1(
∑
m
αm|mS〉k) =
∑
m
αm|mSS−1〉k
=
∑
m
αm|m〉k; (8)
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3.4. Kind 20
Kind 20 represents that P, SK ∈ C and C, PK, E ,D ∈ Q. This kind
consists of two subclasses, one is that the public-key is composed only by
quantum state, the other is that it employs a random changed pair of classical
string and quantum state as public-key.
Protocol 2 (P, SK ∈ C;C, PK, E ,D ∈ Q).
In Kawachi’s protocol[14], the public-key is the quantum state ρ+pi = |σ〉+
|σpi〉, where σ ∈ Sn. And the private-key is a permutation pi selected from
Sn.
[Encryption]
1. If Bob intends to send message ”0” to Alice, he sends Alice ρ+pi ,
2. If he wants to transmit ”1”, he sends Alice ρ−pi , where ρ
−
pi is obtained
from the operations as follows:
|σ〉+ |σpi〉 7→ (−1)sgn(σ)|σ〉+ (−1)sgn(σpi)|σpi〉 (9)
[Decryption] Alice decrypts Bob’s ciphertext using the private-key pi.
Protocol 3 (P, SK ∈ C;C, PK, E ,D ∈ Q).
Quantum public-key encryption protocol[15] based on conjugate coding
employs a random changed pair of bit string and quantum state as public-
key and a Boolean function as private-key. Let the public-key be (s,Hk|i〉),
the private-key be F , where s is used just once time, i ∈ Ωb, Ωb = {i ∈
{0, 1}n|i1⊕ · · · ⊕ in = b}. The owner of private-key uses bit string of public-
key s as input to F to compute k which is an important element in preparing
quantum state.
[Encryption]
1. Bob wants to transmit one bit message b to Alice, he gets one of Alice’s
public-key and then selects a bit j from Ωb,
2. He applies Y j to Hk|i〉,
3. He sends (s, Y jHk|i〉) to Alice.
[Decryption]
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1. Alice calculates F (s) = k,
2. She removes the transformation Hk from the quantum state, and gets
Y j|i〉,
3. She measures Y j|i〉 with basis {0, 1}n to acquire the plaintext.
3.5. Kind 32
This kind requests that P ∈ C and C, PK, SK, E ,D ∈ Q. Kind 32
usually uses EPR pairs as public-key and private-key[16, 17] .
Protocol 4 (P ∈ C;C, pK, sK, E ,D ∈ Q).
Denote the public-key as Sp = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} and private-key as Sq =
{q1, q2, . . . , qn}. Both the public-key and private-key are in the Bell state:
|Φ+〉12 = 1√2(|00〉12 + |11〉12). Particle 1 is belong to public-key and particle
2 is private-key.
[Encryption] If Bob intends to send r-bit classical messagem = {m1, m2, . . . , mr}:
1. he prepares r-qubit quantum state |m〉 = {|m1〉, |m2〉, . . . , |mr〉},
2. he uses Alice’s public-key Sp to do CNOT operations on the prepared
quantum state:
Cpili|Φ+〉piqi|mi〉li =
1√
2
(|00mi〉+ |11mi〉)piqili , (10)
3. sends all these particles to Alice.
[Decryption]
1. When receiving ciphertext, Alice uses her private-key Sq to do CNOT
operations:
Cqili
1√
2
(|00mi〉+ |11mi〉)piqili = |Φ+〉piqi|mi〉li, (11)
2. Alice measures the state with basis {|0〉, |1〉} to get the plaintext.
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3.6. Kind 40
This kind aims at encrypting quantum message, requiring PK, SK ∈ C
and P,C, E ,D ∈ Q. Li Yang and Fujita proposed some quantum counter-
parts of McEliece cryptosystem[12, 18] . Such protocols are belong to this
kind. We can use Protocol 1 to transmit quantum message, so this kind
exists.
3.7. Kind 52
This kind requersts: SK ∈ C and P,C, PK, E ,D ∈ Q. Gotteseman
was the first one to consider quantum state as public-key, and proposed an
information-theoretically secure QPKE[7].
Protocol 5 (sK ∈ C;P,C, pK, E ,D ∈ Q).
Let Alice’s public-key be |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(I⊗Uk)(|0〉|0〉+|1〉|1〉), and private-key
be k.
[Encryption]
Bob uses Alice’s public-key to encrypt quantum menssage |ϕ〉 = α|0〉 +
β|1〉:
he teleports the quantum message through the public-key:
|ϕ〉|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(α|0〉+ β|1〉)(|0〉 ⊗ Uk|0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ Uk|1〉) (12)
and by measuring the first and second particles, the whole system becomes:
|ϕ〉|ψ〉 = 1
2
|Φ+〉(αUk|0〉+ βUk|1〉) + 1
2
|Φ−〉(αUk|0〉 − βUk|1〉) +
1
2
|Ψ+〉(βUk|0〉+ αUk|1〉)1
2
|Ψ−〉(− βUk|0〉+ αUk|1〉)
=
1
2
|Φ+〉Uk ◦ I|ϕ〉+ 1
2
|Φ−〉Uk ◦ Z|ϕ〉
+
1
2
|Ψ+〉Uk ◦X|ϕ〉+ 1
2
|Ψ−〉Uk ◦XZ|ϕ〉. (13)
Bob gets the corresonding Pauli matrix P and sends Alice P and 2nd
register of public-key.
[Decryption]
After receiving ciphertext (P, UkP |ϕ〉), Alice decrypts it by performing
U−1k then P
−1, and gets the plaintext |ϕ〉.
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Remark 1. The kind 52 can be extended to a multi-qubit protocol with the
help of the multi-qubit unknown state teleportation, which can be accom-
plished in a qubit-wise way. The feasibility of this kind of teleportation can
be proved with mathematical induction[19].
The teleportation of two-qubit state has been studied in the Ref. [20, 21,
22]. Now, we suppose (n−1)-qubit state: |ψ1〉 =
∑
i1,...,in−1
αi1,...,in−1 |i1, . . . , in−1〉
has been already transmitted successfully by the same way of sending two-
qubit state. And the operations to reconstruct the (n − 1) particles are
U1⊗ · · ·⊗Un−1. Now, we prove that the quantum state of n-qubit state will
be send by n EPR pairs |Φ+〉.
The arbitrary n-qubit unknown state is a mixed state, which is the super-
position of each component: |ψ2〉 =
∑
i1...in
αi1...in |i1 . . . in〉1,...,n. The teleporta-
tion of |ψ2〉 is equal to teleport each component. The mixed state is also
pure state, and each component is independent. Thus, |ψ2〉 can be expressed
as: |ψ2〉 = |ψ21〉|0〉+ |ψ22〉|1〉, where |ψ21〉 and |ψ22〉 are independent of each
other. So another expression of |ψ2〉 is:
|ψ2〉 = |ψ21〉1,...,n−1|0〉n + |ψ22〉1,...,n−1|1〉n
=
∑
i
′
1
...i
′
n−1
α
′
i
′
1
...i
′
n−1
|i′1 . . . i
′
n−1〉1,...,n−1|0〉n +
∑
i
′′
1
...i
′′
n−1
α
′′
i
′′
1
...i
′′
n−1
|i′′1 . . . i
′′
n−1〉1,...,n−1|1〉n. (14)
Alice and Bob preshare EPR pair |Φ+〉n+1,n+2, . . . , |Φ+〉3n−1,3n. Based on the
assumption that (n − 1)-qubit state is transmitted by the same method of
qubit-wise teleportation, Bob also sends the nth qubit through teleportation.
Since the mixed state can be considered as pure state, we conclude the pre-
viously transmitted (n− 1) qubits in the the following operation to simplify
expression:
∑
i1...in
αi1...in|i1 . . . in〉1,...,n|Φ+〉3n−1,3n
If Bob performs Bell measurement on particle n and particle 3n− 1, his
measurement outcome should be one of the four possibilities: |Φ+〉n,3n−1,
|Φ−〉n,3n−1, |Ψ+〉n,3n−1 and |Ψ−〉n,3n−1. The probability of each result is 14 .
Once Alice receives the message send by Bob, she can fix up her state, recov-
ering |ψ2〉, by applying the appropriate quantum gate U1⊗· · ·⊗Un. To each
operation Ui, if Bob’s measurement outcome yields |Φ+〉, Alice does not need
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to do anything. If the measurement outcome is |Φ−〉 then Alice can fix up
her state by applying the Z gate. If the measurement outcome is |Ψ+〉, Alice
does transformation X to reconstruct the state. If |Ψ−〉, Alice uses first an
X and then a Z gate to recover the state.
3.8. Kind 64
All the six elements in this kind are belong to quantum space, we give a
simple example as follows:
Protocol 6 (P,C, PK, SK, E ,D ∈ Q).
Let plaintext be
∑
m
αm|m〉. Public-key SPK and private-key SSK are in
the entangled state 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B).
[Encryption]
1. Bob performs CNOT operation on the quantum state with Alice’s
public-key Spk:
Cpili
∑
m
αm|Φ+〉piqi|mi〉li =
1√
2
(|00mi〉+ |11mi〉)piqili , (15)
2. Bob sends the ciphertext to Alice.
[Decryption]
1. Alice decrypts with her private-key SsK :
Cqili
1√
2
(|00mi〉+ |11mi〉)piqili = |Φ+〉pili|mi〉li , (16)
2. Alice gets the plaintext in the second register.
4. Type N
As shown in Table 1, 52 kinds protocol are unable to be constrcuted. The
encryption expression of QPKE can be written as:
C = EncPK(P ). (17)
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It refers to that giving plaintext and public-key to the encryption algorithm,
the output is the ciphertext.
The expression of decryption is:
P = DecSK(C). (18)
The input for the decryption algorithm are ciphertext and private-key, and
the plaintext will be obtained.
According to Eq. 18, if one element of both the input and output is
belong to quantum space, the encryption algorithm must have the ability to
process quantum elements. So the encryption algorithm should be belong to
quantum space. Through this analysis, we can confirm that kind 5, 6, 9, 10,
17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49, 50, 53, 54, 57,
58, 61, 62 does not exist.
Analogous to encryption process, if one of private-key, ciphertext and
plaintext is belong to quantum space, the decryption algorithm is also belong
to quantum space. So kind 7, 11, 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 43, 47, 51, 55,
59, 63 are impossible to construct.
When one of the inputs for the quantum encryption algorithm, plaintext
or public-key, the output should be quantum states. If not, it means Quan-
tum coherent components disappear after encryption and the output remains
only one component. So quantum state degenerates into a classical one. That
is, most of the information in plaintext are missing with the processing of
encryption. Such protocol is useless in transmitting message. Kind 12, 24,
36, 44, 48, 56 are non-exist.
Similarly, if either ciphertext or private-key is quantum during the process
of decryption, the plaintext must be quantum states. The reason is the same
with encryption processing. Thus, kind 13, 14, 16 are impossible.
5. Type O
For Kind 3: (P,C, PK, SK,D ∈ C; E ∈ Q), Kind 4: (P,C, PK, SK ∈
C; E ,D ∈ Q), Kind 28: (P, PK,∈ C;C, SK, E ,D ∈ Q) and Kind 60: (PK,∈
C;P,C, SK, E ,D ∈ Q), we are uncertain about their existence and also
cannot determin their non-existence. If we consider classical plaintext as a
special case of quantum plaintext, Kind 28 can be classified into Kind 60.
There may be some novel and intersting QPKE protocols of Kind 3, 4, 28,
60 which are worth further studying.
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6. Discussion
By classification, we review some QPKE protocols that are fully studied,
make a list of impossible QPKE protocols and figure out the kinds which
their existence is still an open problem. However, when it comes to type
O, we cannot either give a proof of its existence or of its non-existence.
In this paper, public-key distribution and the key generation are not taken
into consideration. If these two phase are considered in the classification of
QPKE protocols, the problem would be more complex, and there may be
more interesting QPKE protocols to think about.
In public-key encryption protocol, there are some security notions, such
as computational security, information-theoretically security, semantic secu-
rity, malleable, non-malleable and so on. If we classify the QPKE protocols
according the security notions, the classification will be more complex but
more specific.
7. Conclusions
Based on the six-tuple of QPKE, we classify the 64 kinds of QPKE pro-
tocols into three types. First type includes 8 kinds of protocols that all have
been presented yet and worth deeply studying. Second type includes 52 kinds
of protocols that are are proved to be unable to construct or are no use to
construct. The remaining protocols are worth further discussing.
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